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1. INTRODUCTION
If this paper had a sub-title it would be 'the Asian financial crisis after one year' .'
The beginning of the Asian financial crisis is usually taken as the decision of the
Bank of Thailand on July 4, 1997 to cease its defence of the baht and to allow the
currency to float freely. This decision, which came unexpectedly and as a shock to
many market participants, was both the beginning of a classic financial crisis in
Thailand and the onset ofcontagion which saw the financial crisis extend throughout
Asia, having serious effects on South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and
Malaysia. The remainder of 1997 and early 1998 saw a general fall in asset prices
and financial distress and the extension of financial support by the International
Monetary Fund (IMP) to Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines. In
\998, the effects of the financial crisis spread to the real sector in these and other
economies evidenced through reduced industrial production. income. employment
and economic activity. Although the initial official responses to the financial crisis
were to play down the potential seriousness of the crisis, and were to project a rapid
recovery from the crisis, it soon became dear that there was an economic problem
and that denial was not a useful policy stance.
In July \998, the position is that economic growth has been seriously reduced
throughout Asia and that a number of econontics including Japan, Thailand, South
Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia. Hong Kong and Singapore are now in recession
although Thailand. South Korea. Indonesia are much more seriously affected. The
economic problems of Japan are of longer slanding, being a failure to resolve the
bursting of the bubble in stock prices and land prices in the late 1980s. The
resolution of these problems, which requires working out of the bad debts in the
Earlier versions of some aspects of this paper were presented at two seminars. The ftrst
was '1'he Asian Financial Crisis and the Rural Sector", United Graziers Association
(South East Queensland Division), Toowoomba, December 1997. The second was '"The
Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of Financial Markets", Department of Economics,
University of Queensland, May 1998.
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banking system and a restructuring of the financial sector, will have important
effects in the solution of the 1997 financial crisis. Looming in the background are
the potentia) difficulties of the financial sector in China where slowing ofeconomic
growth and a devaluation of the currency would place further pressure on other
Asian economies. However the analysis in this paper takes the economic outlook
in and economic policies ofthe USA, Japan and Chinaas given; deterioration in any
of these will make recovery from the Asian financial crisis more difficult and
protracted. While there are many issues relating to the role of the official agencies
such as the IMF to be considered, they are not analysed here.
In July 1998, the important questions to be answered are:
• what were the causes of the Asian financial crisis?
• what are the observable characteristics of the crisis in the first year?
• has the crisis reached the trough?
• what are the prospects for recovery from the crisis and for a renewal of
economic growth?
• what are some of the lessons to be learned from the crisis? .
2. CAUSES OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Without wishing to discuss the causes of the crisis in extensive detail, the Asian
financial crisis is taken to be aclassic monetary and financial crisis. Financial crisis
and associated hubbIes have been features of capitalist economies since at least the
17th century. The path of capitalist economic development like that of true love
does not run smooth. The most severe financial crisis in the 20th century was the
Great Depression of the 1930s which followed the bursting of the stock market
bubble in Wall Street in 1929 and which saw a serious dislocation in economic
activity in many economies. In the USA, the contraction of economic activity from
peak to trough was ofthe order of25 percent; in Australia. the contraction was even
more serious as the unemployment rate in the 1930s is estimated to have exceeded
30%. Financial crises have occurred in the USA and Australia since the 1930s but
have been less severe, giving rise to Raymond Goldsmith's dictum that mature
economies in resolving financial crises create institutional arrangements which
ameliorate later adverse economic shocks.
The nature of a classic financial crisis has the following attributes:
1. the crisis occurs after a period of sustained real sector, particularly capital
formation and growth;
2. real sector growth before the crisis has substantial speculative elements
which can be described as a "bubble" in asset prices;
3. a bubble is a positive deviation from fundamental values or prices;
4. the beginning of the crisis is sparked by some external shock or change in
policy;
5. the crisis is defined by a sharp fall in asset prices;
6. the fall in asset prices causes a sharp deterioration in balance sheet positions
which invokes a general loss of confidence, an increased demand for
liquidity and an attempt to reduce debt;
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7. these factors result in liquidity and solvency problems for banks and other
financial institutions;
8. in the worst case, there may be a Widespread failure of financial institutions
and a flight from money;
9. these adverse financial effects result in a reduction of economic activity
described as a recession or depression depending on the severity of the fall;
10. recovery occurs through the elimination of bad debts and the strengthening
of the economy's financial position and restoration of confidence.
The Asian economies had experienced sustained and substantial growth over
a period of at least two decades which had transformed backward economies to
affluent and modem societies. This growth was fuelled by input growth, that is by
using more labour and capital which was achieved by drawing labour from the rural
sector to industrial occupations, by increases in literacy and basic education and by
capital equipment financed by high domestic savings. As has been seen from the
experience ofthe former USSR and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, growth based on
a massive increase in inputs has a natural limit. However, this by itselfis not enough
to explain a financial crisis; all it can do is explain a slowing down of growth rates
as diminishing returns and diseconomies of scale set in. In recent years, the Asian
economies had an increasingly inefficient investment process; more and more
capital assets were used to create over-capacity and grandiose projects which failed
to produce an economic return to meet the economic costs incurred in their
construction. In addition, investment in social overhead infrastructure was skimped
and environment considerations were largely ignored. Among the inefficient
capital formation can be numbered
1. over investment by the Korean chaebol in computer chips, motor vehicles,
steel and ship building
2. CBD commercial property development in Thailand
3. the National Car project in Indonesia
4. the world's tallest building, the linear city and the new international airport
in Malaysia
5. the new international airport in Hong Kong.
These misallocations were possible because of government direction of
investment and capital funding, corruption and crony capitalism and undeveloped
capital markets.
The lack of social infrastructure is evident in the congestion and pollution of
major Asian cities and the lack of amenities which promote other efficiencies
(while Malaysia has the major edifices referred to above, suburbs ofKuala Lumpur
do not have domestic piped water). Indonesia was the prime case of environmental
vandalism through logging and burning of forests. The forest fires in Indonesia in
1997 generated substantial costs for itself and neighbouring countries as the smoke
and haze created health problems and dangers to airline operations.
Despite the high savings rates in Asian countries, the recent experience has
been to finance domestic investment by borrowing from foreign banks. The
external debt ofthe economies has increased to levels which raised questions about
their sustainabiliry. Significant speculation emerged in these economies through
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the financing of long positions in domestic assets through short-term unhedged
foreign currency loans. This position was sustainable only so long as fixed
exchange rates were maintained, together with foreign confidence in the ability to
repay debt and by implicit government guarantees of the banking system.
The beginnings of the crisis was the decision of the Bank of Thailand to float
the baht after several attempts to defend it against speculative attacks. The defence
of the baht had involved a strategy of
1. active intervention in the spot and forward foreign exchange market;
2. increasing domestic interest rates;
3. instituting formal and informal exchange and capital controls to segment
the Thai foreign market into "onshore" and "offshore" markets with the
intention of squeezing foreign speculators.
While this policy was successful in stabilising the baht over an extended
period and repelling the heavy speculative attack by hedge funds in May 1997,
the real weakness in the economy remained uncorrected; the defence of the baht
by these policy measures could not be sustained indefinitely. By July 1997, the
foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Thailand had fallen to the minimum
level required by law to back the domestic money supply.
The high level of domestic interest rates in Thailand had encouraged local
corporations to borrow abroad at much lower interest rates to finance speculative
activity in real estate. These loans were unhedged because of the widespread and
entrenched belief that the exchange rate would remain fixed. (Later it has been
suggested that the resolve of the Bank of Thailand to defend the baht was
strengthened by the knowledge that foreign borrowings were unhedged.) Once the
baht was allowed to float, the situation changed rapidly; the baht depreciated as
Thai corporations sought to buy foreign exchange and foreign investors reviewed
their valuations of Thai assets and the baht. In consequence, the exchange rate
plummeted.
The fall in the value of the baht was the trigger for contagion as foreign
investors tested the value of other Asian currencies in foreign exchange markets.
In Korea, there had been concerns about the economy and the high levels of short-
term foreign debt; in Indonesia as well, short-term foreign borrowings were high
while in Malaysia there was concern about the bad debts of local banks. In the next
few months, exchange rates and stock market prices fell sharply and the ensuring
examination of the financial and corporate sectors of these economies lead to a
substantially downward reappraisal of the fundamental values of assets in these
economies.
3. THE EFFECTS AFTER THE FIRST YEAR
The effects will be discussed in tenus ofexchange rates. asset prices. interest rates,
credit ratings and the real economy_
3.1 Exchange rates
The change in exchange rates for nine Asian economies over the year to July 4, 1998
is indicated in Table I.
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TABLE I
EXCHANGE RATES, CURRENCY UNITS PER USD,
JULY 4, 1997 TO JULY 4, 1998
Country
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan
Thailand
Source: Data Stream International.
luly 4. 1998
8.28
7.75
14550.0
42.49
41.40
1.70
1368.00
34.36
42.10
One year earlier
8.29
7.75·
2434.5
35.78
26.40
1.43
888.00
27.85
27.75
China and Hong Kong have maintained fixed exchange rates; Hong Kong has
a currency board system which in addition to keeping a fixed exchange rate has 100
per cent foreign exchange backing for the domestic currency issue. All other
exchange rates have fallen but the greatest falls have been in those of the economies
which have obtained IMF support programmes, Thailand, South Korea, the
Philippines and Indonesia. Indonesia has clearly experienced the most severe fall
and the reasons for this marked impact on the Indonesian economy will be
explained later in the paper.
3.2 Asset prices
Other asset prices fell. While statistics on real estate prices are not readily available,
reports are that these have fallen throughout the region. The change in stock market
prices over the year is indicated in Table 2.
TABLE 2
STOCK MARKET CHANGES, JULY 4, 1997 TO JULY 4, 1998
Country
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan
Thailand
Source: Data Stream International.
Change on year in
local currency (%)
12.8
41.7
36.1
55.9
32.9
42.9
59.9
13.1
51.1
Change on year in
USD tenns (%)
12.9
-41.7
-89.3
-73.4
-57.2
-52.0
-74.0
NA
-67.8
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In Table 2, the second column indicates changes in local currency terms and the
third column changes in stock market prices in USD terms; the third column
incorporates the decline in the exchange rate for each country. The change in
foreign currency terms, the third column, is the relevant change for foreign
investors. Again this table indicates that the effect is not the same for each country
and is most marked for the group of economies with IMF programmes.
3.3 Interest rates
The converse of the fall in asset prices is the rise in interest rates; the change over
the year is shown in Table 3 below.
TABLE 3
MONEY MARKET AND SHORT TERM INTEREST RATES,
JULY 4, 1997 AND JULY 4, 1998
Country
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan
Thailand
Source: Data Stream International.
July 4, 1998
8.88
44.00
11.15
13.95
6.32
19.01
7.40
22.00
Year earlier
6.13
11.25
7.42
10.97
3.62
12.44
7.75
22.00
The increase in interest rates is again most marked in the four economies with
IMF support. The rise in interest rates reflects
I. a risk premium (the compensation required by lenders to lend in these
countries rather than in the USA);
2. the effect of more stringent monetary polices; and
3. continuing attempts to support exchange rates.
3.4 Credit ratings
A credit rating for a sovereign country, a financial institution or a trading
corporation is essential to access to international financial markets; many lenders
will simply not deal with parties who are not rated and the trust deeds of US and
European fund managers prescribe that only securities with a minimum credit
rating may be held in the trust portfolio. The major international credit rating
companies are Moody's Investor Services and Standard and Poors. The system of
credit rating symbols used by these companies is indicated in Table 4.
The alphabetical ratings symbols used by both ratings assign a summary view
of the prospects that the rated party will meet its financial obligations on time and
in full; parties with impeccable ratings are given the triple A rating (Aaa or AAA).
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TABLE 4
SYMBOLS USED BY MAJOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
Moody's
Aaa
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B
Caa
Ca
C
Source: Moody's and Standard and Poors.
Standard and Poors
AAA
AA
A
BBB
BB
B
CCC
CC
C
More risky propositions are indicated by a rating of lower down the alphabet. Both
companies use modifiers to these basic ratings; Moody's applies 1,2.3 to indicate
variations within a standard rating grade while Standard and Poors uses "+" and u_
"forthe sarne purpose. The critical cutoff grade is triple B (Baaor BBB); any rating
at this or a superior level is of investment grade being an asset which a prudent
investor would consider eligible for inclusion in their portfolio. Ratings below
triple B involve decidedly speculative elements and a risk of default.
The general experience has been that for parties rated by both agencies the
assigned credit rating is similar but not identical. Although there have been
complaints about the performanceofthe ratings agencies during the Asian financial
crisis, the burden of these complaints has been that the agencies have been slow to
respond to changes and have followed the market rather than lead market changes.
Sovereign credit ratings for the Asian economies at July 20, 1998 are indicated in
Table 5.
The ratings by Moody's give a below investment grade rating to Indonesia,
Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. While Malaysia's long term rating for bonds
and notes is above investment grade and its bank deposit rating is on investment
grade, Moody's has these on credit watch for a possible downgrading. It was
announced on July 24, 1998 that Moody's had cut Malaysia's ratings on bonds and
notes, as indicated in Table 5 above, from A2 to Baa2 and for deposit from Baal
to BaaJ.2 In making the announcements Moody's cited "rapid deterioration in the
economy" and "...the expected effects on the banking system and on government
finances." In the same announcement, Moody's also cut the long-term deposit
ratings of three of the top banks in Malaysia to BaaJ.
Moody's has since July 20, 1998 announced a review of Japan's rating.'
Moody's cited deep structural problems in Japan's economy that had defied
2
3
The Australian Financial Review Weekend July 25-26, 1998
The Australian Financial Review July 24, 1998
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TABLES
SOVEREIGN CEILING FOR FOREIGN CURRENCY RATINGS, ASIAN
ECONOMIES AS AT JULY 20, 1998
Country
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Macau
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
Source: Moody's Investor Servi~.
Note: ** under review for possible downgrade.
Bonds and Notes,
Long Term
A3
A3
B3
Aaa
Bal
Baal
AZ*·
Bal
Aal
Aa3
Bal
Bank Deposits,
Long Term
Baal
A3
Ca
Aaa
Caal
Baal
Baal"
Bol
Aal
Aa3
BI
conventional policy measures and that Japan's policy makers appeared to lack
consensus on how to reform and manage the economy. Market expectations are that
there is a high probability that Japan's ratings will be downgraded.
These ratings support the previously expressed view derived from consideration
of asset prices and interest rates that the economies most affected by the crises are
in the order of the most serious effects: I. Indonesia; 2. Korea; 3. Thailand; and 4.
the Philippines
3.S The real economy
Recent comparative data of the real sectors of Asian economies is difficult to
obtain; however, it is clear from official statements that the following economies
have moved into recession: Indonesia; Thailand; Korea; Hong Kong; and Malaysia.
The extent of the decline in real econontic activity in these countries will be
discussed late in the paper.
4. WHY WAS INDONESIA SO SEVERELY AFFECTED BY THE
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS?
As shown, Indonesia has experienced a fall in asset prices greater than all other
Asian econonties and a greater fall in real GDP. In addition, there were particular
factors which impacted severely on Indonesia. The level of foreign denontinated
debt due for repayment in December 1997 held by the Indonesian private sector was
at least the equivalent of USD 70 billion (equivalent to about 30 per cent of pre-
crisis GDP). The fall in the value of the rupiah ensured that this could not be repaid
on time and in full which is reflected in the credit ratings B3 and Ca of Moody's in
July 1998. Unlike Korea and Thailand where the debt was owed by a relatively
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small number of banks, most of the Indonesian debt was owed by private sector
trading enterprises estimated to be over 200 in all. By the beginning of 1998,
Indonesian borrowers were in default and there were serious difficulties in coming
to an agreement about rescheduling the debt. 4 In June 1998, an agreement between
Indonesia and the Bank Steering Committee reached an agreement on interbank
debt, trade credit am! corporate debt.5
The agreement involved a rescheduling ofdebt and a reduction in the amout to
be repaid involving a delay in repayments over the next two years and full
repayment of the agreed amount three years after that. In effect, the indebted
corporations, said to be the vast majority of companies listed on the Jakarta Stock
Exchange, were insolvent and candidates for bankruptcy. However, under Indonesian
law there is no enforceable bankruptcy law6 so that there are no defined property
rights in bankruptcy. Moreover, the expectation was that unless foreign investors
were cronies of the ruling Suharto junta they would not receive anything in
bankruptcy. A rational expectation valuation of the foreign-owned interests in
Indonesian corporations was zero. This gave an incentive to dispose of these
interests as soon as possible for any positive price. Rationality requires sale to be
made immediately to be able to quit the economy and move on to other more
potentially profitable activities in other countries particularly as in 1998 the
political situation had deteriorated seriously culminating in a popular movement
which removed the government from office and in violent civil unrest in which
4
5
6
The Indonesian government announced its temporary freeze on foreign debt servic~g on
January 12.European and Asian bankers fresh from private talks with Indonesian debtors
warned that anyone expecting a series of smooth roll-overs of short-term debts would be
disappointed. Some banks involved are holding their individual talks, reflecting a vast
array of debts and firms which prevent a smooth South Korean-style solution. Official
Indonesian sources stated that new bankruptcy laws are being drafted (The South China
Morning Post February 9, 1998).
··IMF Management Strongly Welcomes Indonesian Debt Agreements", IMF News Brief
No. 98/17, June 4, 1998.
"Indonesia yesterday estimated the country's foreign debt at USD 137.4 billion and
announced it was drafting a new bankruptcy law to deal with the nation's private debt.
"Companies not able to solve their debt problems ... must have a legal solution. The
government will produce as soon as possible a bankruptcy law," said the Council for
Economic and Financial Resilience set up to deal with the debt crisis. The International
Finance Corporation and anumherofother banks had provided 42 Indonesian companies
with USD I billion in credit to help them payoff their loans."
The Council headed by Radius Prawiro said there would be no guarantee, bailout or
government subsidy ofany kind in assisting with privately held debt. Existing bankruptcy
processes in Indonesia are time consuming and complex. leaving creditors empty handed
after years of chasing debts. The lack of a clear bankruptcy law has further eroded
investor confidence in recent months after the spiralling rupiah made many Indonesian
companies techoicalty bankrupt (The South China Morning Post February 7. 1998).
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widespread looting, distruction of property and violence towards Sino-Indonesians
took place. The unrest promoted a capital flight by Indonesian citizens and the
political turmoil created further uncertainty about values of assets in the future so
that the combined effects saw the creation of excess supply oflndonesian financial
assets in asset markets and an excess supply of rupiah in the foreign exchange
market. Under these circumstances there is no party available to take the other side
of the transaction (no buyers) so there is no limit to the decline in asset prices and
the exchange rate. .
These views reinforced by "currency board debate" in which the Indonesian
,government proposed to create a currency board similiarin principle to that ofHong
Kong where the local currency would be backed 100 per cent by foreign exchange
reserves. The proposal envisaged an exchange rate of 5000 rupiah to the USD but
was correctly seen as a blatant and crude attempt to ensure that existing foreign
exchange reserves would be appropriated by the members ofthe President's family
and their cronies leading to a much worse position and no chance of stabilising the
rupiah. The fundamental criticism ofthe currency board proposal was that Indonesia
did not have and had little chance to acquire the foreign currency required to back
the local currency. A supporter ofthe currency board proposal recognised the short-
term criticisms but argued that the currency board was the appropriate long-term
solution.
The default of Indonesian corporations and their bankruptcy has a number of
effects on the Indonesian economy. The first and most serious is that foreign
counterparty banks will not open Indonesian letters of credit which are a basic
feature of international trade. The IMF has noted the main elements of the
Indonesian program are "Accelerated arrangements to develop a framework with
foreign creditors to restore trade finance and to resolve the issues of corporate debt
and interbank credit." Without letter of credit facilities exporters and importers
have to make their own arrangements about financing their customers and paying
for their purchases. This means that exporters have to bear the risk of default or
delayed payment by their customers and importers have to find foreign currency
immediately on shipment of their purchases rather than have the usual trade credit
of perhaps 90 days. Naturally this has a devastating effect on trade and, coupled
with the devaluation of the rupiah, suggests trade will grind to a halt. The
consequential effects on the economy will be snbstantial with reduced production
and increased unemployment. Just how far the economy will turn down is
impossible to predict but it must be said in all seriousness that the current
indications are that there is no sign of a bottom to the fall.
5. OUTLOOK FOR THE ASIAN ECONOMIES
What is the outlook for the second year of the Asian financial crisis to July 1999?
There are three current views:
1. there will be a ..v.. shaped recession and recovery;
2. there will be a protracted "U" shaped recession before recovery;
3. there will be an "L" shaped recession with no definite sign of recovery by
July 1999.
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The "V" Scenario: This is obviously the most optimistic of the scenarios and
is based on the view that the current recession is only a short sharp correction or
interruption to the inevititable long term high growth rates that the Asian economies
had posted over the last 20 years. The more up-beat projections ofthis scenario see
the Asian economies restored to positive growth in the 2000 financial year.
The "U" Scenario: This view is more skeptical of the ability of the Asian
economies to bounce back from the current setback in the short term and projects
a recession of more than onc year' 5 duration.
The "L" Scenario: This scenario is the most pessimistic of the three and differs
from the first two in two important resPects. The first difference is that the "V"
scenario sees amuch more abrupt and deeper recession; the second is that the timing
and extent of the recovery is highly uncertain.
The "V" scenario is favoured by the governments of the Asian economies, by
the official agencies particularly the IMF and by commentators and other
governments who had been enthusiastic boosters of "the Asian miracle". The
response of many commentators and official agencies in Australia to the Asian
financial crisis was denial. I won't embarrass those people by citing chapter and
verse but you may remember the 1997 pronouncements which said that the crisis
was a short-term adjustment that would be over in a few months. This is clearly not
so.
We can obtain some clear information that the official agencies and the IMF
have systematically understated the decline in economic activity. As part of the
IMP support program, countries are required to set out their policy intentions and
policy prescriptions in a document entitled "Letters oflntent of the government of
"Country", which describes the policies that the "Country" intends to implement
in the context of its request for financial support from the IMF:'
The IMP program for Thailand has produced three reviews resulting in three
letters of intent. The changes in the estimates for 1996, 1997 and projections for
1998 are presented in Table 6. .
TABLE 6
CHANGES IN OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF REAL GDP GROWTH IN
THAILAND ( PER CENT PER YEAR)
Year
1996
1997
1998
First Letter of Intent
November 25, 1997
6.4
2.5
3.5
Third Letter of Intent
June 10, 1998
5.5
-0.4
-4.0 '0 -5.5
Source: Letters of Intent of Government ofThailand; see also Mid Year Economic Review, Bangkok
Post, 30 June 1998.
The revisions to the 1996 and 1997 growth figures over a period of six months
indicate that that there is a broad confidence limit; the estimate of 1998 growth has
changed by 9 percentage points over six months.
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TABLE 7
CHANGE IN OFFICIAL REAL GDP PROJECTIONS, KOREA
Source
Letter of Intent Dece~ber 3,1997
Letter of Intent May 2, 1998*
Projection, 1998
(% per year)
3.0
-1.0
Source: Letters of Intent of me government of Korea.
Note: The Letter of [otenl states "although more negative growth. remains possible",
The revision of the Korean growth estimate of 4 percentage points in six
months suggests that even the short-term economic forecasting techniques used in
this exercise lack precision.
The IMFhas systematically underestimated the decline in GDPin Thailand and
Korea. On April 2. 1998 the Managing Director ofthe IMF stated: "We expect GDP
to decline by about 3 per cent in Thailand this year and by 1 per cent in Korea'"
It was said above that there is no bottom in sight to the Indonesian recession.
The moving projections by the Indonesian authorities and the IMF are reported in
Table 8.
TABLE 8
CHANGE IN OFFICIAL REAL GDP PROJECTIONS, INDONESIA
Source
Letter of Intent January 15, 1998
Letter of Intent April 10, 1998
Letter of Intent'June 24, 1998
Projection. 1998
(% per year)
0.0
-5.0
more than -10.0
The Letter oflntent ofthe Indonesian government dated April 10. 1998 stated:
"We expect the economy to start to recover in the second half of 1998 and the
decline in real GDP is predicted to be 4 per cent for the fiscal year."
We would conclude that the economic projections in the official Letters of
Intent are not credible and are designed to sugar coat the pill of the stringent
economic measures which must be implemented. The Economisfmagazine cites
some economic facts which belie the official forecasts:
1. Indonesian exports declined by more than 70 per cent in April 1988
compared with the sarne month in 1997;
2. about 20.000 Korean companies have failed this year;
3. car production in Thailand fell 77 per cent in the first five months of 1998.
, Michael Camdesslls, "Is the Asian Crisis OverT', Address to the National Press Club,
Washington D.C.. April 2. 1998.
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Private sector forecasts are much more gloomly than the official one; these·
forecasts according to The Economist are for the following declines in real GDP this
year: Korea 8 per cent; Thailand 6 per cent; and Indonesia 15 per cent or perhaps
even 25 per cent.
Some Thai analysts suggest that the bottom to Thailand's decline may be
reached in October 1998 while the Asian regional manager of Moody's has stated
that recovery may not take place for anywhere from 3 to 7 years.
The conditions for recovery are stringent; recovery wiH not occur until the
following minimum conditions eventuate:
• persistent surpluses on the current account of the balance of payments allow
the repayment of debt and the IMF;
• credit ratings are restored to investment grade;
• reform of the financial sector is established.
None of these will be achieved in 1998. The reform of the financial sector of
the Asian economies will under the most optimistic estimates take two years to
implement the basic regulatory structure and no country envisages that their
banking system will meet the international accepted capital adequacy standards
before 2001. On all of these grounds we would reject the optimistic "V" scenario
and suggest that the "U" scenario is the more likely for Korea and Thailand, and that
positive growth may not be achieved for five years.
Indonesia is a different case entirely. This analysis of the Indonesian economy
concludes that it has been hit most severely and that there is no bottom in sight.
Indonesia matches the pessimestic "L" scenario.
6. LESSONS FROM THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
The lessons of the Asian financial crisis are that, although it can be seen as a classic
financial crisis, concentration on the macroeconomic indicators ofthe past experience
of the IMF, provides no good guidance to how well economies are performing. In
the 1990s in a global financial environment successful economies are required to
have well functioning financial systems, sound corporate governance, open, honest
and accountable government, enforceable bankruptcy laws and transparency in
economic transactions. The process of economic refonn is not a once-and-for-all
action; regular evaluation of economic regulatory structure is required.
Alice M. Rivlin, Vice Chair of US Federal Reserve System, has suggested that
there are three prescriptions arising from the lessons of the crisis which would, in
future, improve economic perfonnance and moderate the effect of financial crises.
These are:
I. world's capital markets would function beller with more complete,
accessable and timely information flows. Improving transparancy should
apply not only to business and banks, but to official bodies;
2. the structure, functioning and supervision of financial systems in emerging
market countries should be strengthened;
3. private creditors should take on a greater portion of the burden of resolving
future international financial crises.
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Michael Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, has suggested building
blocks for a new financial architecture for a globalised world which are:
1. globalization provides countries fully integrating into the world economy
the potential for growth and prosperity;
2. universal consensus on importance of an increasingly open and liberal
system of capitaillows for globalisation to deliver its promises;
3. the golden rule of transparency;
4. good governance;
5. a set of standards and codes of best practice;
6. an option for a multilateral approach to handle problems.
These prescriptions is that they require substantial structural change in many
economies and they are unlikely to be realised in the short term.
7. CONCLUSIONS
After one year of the Asian financial crisis, all Asian economies have experienced
a decline in asset prices and economic activity. The most seriously affected have
been Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. These economies are in default on their
foreign debt and their credit ratings have been downgraded to below investment
grade. Throughout the region economies have moved into recession and the
prospects for an early recovery are regarded as slight.
Three possible recovery paths have been considered (characterised as the V, U
and L scenarios). The analysis here rejects the "V" scenario as too optimistic and
as implausible but regards the "U" scenario as more probable for Korea and
Thailand. The position in Indonesia is more serious and it must be said that there
is no foreseeable bottom to the recession. Thus the "L" scenario is considered
applicable to Indonesia.
Recovery will not come to the Asian economies until they do the following:
I. generate a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments to
repay outstanding debt;
2. sell assets to foreigners to repay foreign debt;
3. restructure their banking systems to international standards of prudence;
4. improve corporate governance;
5. implement workable bankruptcy laws;
6. lift their credit rating to investment grade.
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